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DETAILS OF ARGUMENT 
1 
THE BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF MISSTATES THE RECORD REGARDING 
FURNISHING OF INVOICES AND COMPLETION OF THE JOB 
Plaintiff's Brief at page 17 states that at the time of 
trial Plaintiff had not received all of the invoices 
requested because the job was not totally completed. 
Whereas, the fact of the matter is that at the time of trial 
the job had been completed and there had been a final 
inspection. All of the final invoices recently issued were 
timely mailed to counsel for Plaintiff at his former address. 
The invoices arrived at his new address on the first day of 
the trial and he had them with him the morning of the second 
day of the trial. 
The statement in Plaintiff's Brief that the job had not 
been completed at the time of trial does not conform to the 
facts. The job had been completed and there had been a final 
inspection. There may have been left punch list items. 
TR Vol. I, page 3: 
"...The Court: Mr. Stark? Mr. Stark: 
Your Honor, the — the job has been 
completed to the extent that there's been 
a final inspection, and there may be— 
may be a punch list, but all of the 
invoices with respect to the electrical 
materials portion of it are in. 
I received copies and mailed copies to 
counsel. He says he's changed his 
address in the last about twenty days. 
Mr. Jones: About three weeks. Mr. 
Stark: Or something like that. We've 
also sent to him an analysis of -- an up-
to-date analysis of what the claim for 
damages is based on the original bid and 
based on the invoices that we have now 
received from Whitehead Electric and 
Electrical Wholesale. 
I've got copies here for him and we did 
mail copies and I cannot account for his 
statement that he hasn't received them 
because they were placed in the mail to 
him." 
THERE WAS NO FINDING ON THE MATTER OF 
DAMAGES NOR WAS ONE REQUIRED 
Plaintiff's Brief claims that Defendant did not carry 
his burden of proof with respect to damages. In view of the 
ruling of the trial court of no cause for action, the 
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question of damages was not reached by the Judge although as 
pointed out in Defendant's Brief there is ample evidence in 
the record to sustain such an award. 
3 
THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT DEFENDANT ACCEPTED 
PLAINTIFF'S LOW PRICE AND THAT THERE WAS 
DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE 
Plaintiff's 3rief at item 9, pages 6 and 7, and at page 
10 states that there was no acceptance by Plaintiff of the 
first bid of Defendant. 
Whereas, the Transcript, Vol. I at page 61 indicates the 
following: 
"Q. When you got this price from Graybar 
at, you say about 9:30 on the 20th of 
July, in the morning, who did you talk 
with? A. Kerry Pusey. Q. He gave you 
that figure? A. Yes. Q. Did you have 
any further discussion with respect to 
that figure? A. Did I what? Q. Did 
you have any further discussion with him 
with respect to that figure? A. I told 
him I was going to use it and was it all 
right and he said yes. Q. Okay." 
The trial judge's ruling is as follows (TR Vol II, pages 
142 and 43): 
"I think there is a distinction between 
what's moral and what's legal, and it 
seems to me that if somebody calls up and 
says, we'll do it for a certain price, 
that they should — they should do it for 
a certain price. 
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From the standpoint of the law, there is 
no -- there is obviously no contract 
because a contract requires offer and 
acceptance and there's no offer, or 
there's no acceptance. A bid is in the 
nature of an offer, and there's actually 
no acceptance of that offer until after-
- after the contract is accepted by the 
general or the general receives the bid 
and then accepts the subcontract and so 
on. 
And under the law of contracts, any time 
a party to a contract wants to withdraw, 
they have a right to withdraw an offer 
any time prior to acceptance. That's— 
I think that's where the doctrine of 
Promissory Estoppel comes into play 
because of situations like this. It's 
not the classic offer/acceptance 
situation. 
Under Promissory Estoppel if somebody 
submits a bid relying upon that bid, the 
Court's going to come along later and 
say, well, we're — we're going to estop 
the — the subcontractor from denying the 
fact that they have — that they have 
made a bid at a particular figure and 
that the contractor relied upon that bid. 
The thing that's lacking in this case, of 
course, is the reliance. When — when 
Graybar contacted Mr. Lewis and indicated 
to him that it was a mistake and that 
they could not go with the lower bid, 
when he submitted his bid then he wasn't 
relying upon that — there wasn't the 
detrimental reliance that would be 
normally required in a Promissory 
Estoppel situation. 
He submitted his bid based upon a hope 
-4-
that he would be able to -- to get the 
material for the lower price, but in this 
case it appears to be a vain hope. So 
Promissory Estoppel will fail based on 
the fact that there wasn't a reliance 
upon the Graybar figure, that's the 
$213,400. So the Court reluctantly finds 
no cause on the second action or the 
second cause of action." 
At what point in time would there have been detrimental 
reliance? 
If Defendant had left his office for the bid depository 
or had filed his bid at the depository prior to notice of the 
claimed error, there would have been detrimental reliance. 
On the other hand, if Defendant had received notice of 
the claimed error early enough to have revised his bid forms 
and still submit on bime at the depository, there would not 
have been detrimental reliance. 
However, where, as in this case, Defendant did not have 
sufficient time to change his bid forms after notice of the 
claimed error and still submit on time, there was detrimental 
reliance. 
Plaintiff's Brief speculated what Defendant could have 
done regarding changing his bid. However, the solid evidence 
is that Defendant accepted Plaintiff's low price and relied 
on it in working up his bid forms. The evidence clearly 
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